Alright Matti, you’ve convinced me. The moral “oughts” that we feel are based upon “is”. Apparently Searle was right that our language naturally sets up our notions of oughts from is, and Kovesi too. I should have known this all along given my observation that “is is all there is”. Thus if there are any oughts (and we clearly do feel them), then they can only come from is. I was imagining that my own heuristic was going further than Hume’s, though it was actually refuting his!
One related question is, what would happen if Hume’s heuristic were generally dismissed in academia? Would or should ethics begin to be explored empirically? I have radical thoughts on this but should ask what you think?
Eric, Thanks for reading this long post. Your second question is complex, yes? As I tried to say—more than once—these posts on Hume have nothing to do with the source of ethics. BTW, that was Kovesi’s position about the argument in his book as well. I will need to work on that and have no simple response. On the main point it seems the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy was very helpful in dealing with what I have been calling Hume’s muddle. And that muddle, in my opinion, starts with Hume’s misunderstanding of facts.
Yes I do realize that your posts don’t get into the origins or potential future of ethics. But I can’t help wondering what would or should happen if academia were to support the position that you’ve laid out. I doubt you’d like some of these implications, though I would.
If oughts exist by means of is, then this suggests that psychologists should ultimately become the most appropriate people to determine that which constitutes our feelings of right versus wrong behavior. I suspect that this is virtually inconceivable to most today, though that’s how I think things should eventually go. And I certainly don’t mean in a “Sam Harris” way! Here’s the path that I currently consider most hopeful:
First it should become empirically determined that consciousness (and thus value itself), exists by means of a neurally produced electromagnetic field. Thus it should be realized that the value of existing for anything is defined by quantifiable causal stuff, or “is”. Then from this premise psychologists should have enough political cover (against the deontic or background power that you mentioned with Wyrd) to develop effective hedonistic models of our nature and so succeed no less than economists already do by means of this premise. With effective psychological models from which to work these professionals should then observe that our various moral notions reduce back to a sensitivity that we feel for others (or care), as well as the theory of mind sensations that we feel, like guilt and pride. Though this should take a sizable bite out of traditional philosophy, philosophical exploration of ethics could still go on in the traditional way for some. Indeed, I suspect there will be both “meta scientists” who provide science with professionally accepted principles of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology, and standard philosophy which remains more of an art to potentially appreciate for those who are so inclined.
Eric, I cannot get past your first sentence. You say: “If oughts exist by means of is, then this suggests that psychologists should ultimately become the most appropriate people to determine that which constitutes our feelings of right versus wrong behavior.”
1.) First, as I said, oughts do not simply exist by means of is. That’s an oversimplification. I already tried to clarify the more nuanced refutation of Hume in the original post. There’s no more I can say.
2.) Next, the rebuttal of Hume’s thesis in no way “suggests that psychologists become the most appropriate people” to further explore ethics. That, at best, is speculation and, at worst, a non sequitur.
3.) Finally, the rest of your theory apparently assumes that progress in understanding the source of ethics will be based on psychological studies of, as you suggest, the hedonistic side of our human nature. I think I understand your theory. All I can say is, I’ll wait to see the proof.
I suspect some day there actually will be proof that I’m right about these sorts of things Matti. And if history tells us anything, it’s that people only ever grasp the past though perpetually seem fooled about the future. Who knows what might start a great avalanche to bring the change that I consider both needed and inevitable? Perhaps empirical proof of EMF consciousness would unleash all that snow? In that case ethics would ultimately reduce back to such physics. Hopefully reason would then begin to prevail regarding value and so remake our sorry mental and behavioral sciences in general. It might still be weeks until I’m sufficiently satisfied with that essay, though I hope you’ll appreciate the enormous implications that such an empirical discovery would have.
Eric, I submit that to only say, as you did, that “…oughts exist by means of is…” is not I think what Searle and Kovesi fully meant. I’m not sure you mean it in such a straightforward way yourself. Certain factual descriptions, some of which have normative implications, are created in the language through a publicly conducted discussion and debate process which Kovesi describes in detail very well. And certain factual descriptions in our language then function to evaluate and/or give us (using Searle’s vocabulary) desire independent reasons for acting—that is oughts. Searle in one of his lectures a few years ago talked about how major changes in a society or revolutions involve major changes in language. Think about how the language shifted dramatically (I’m thinking of English) as the feminist movement began to persuade us that women had unrecognized rights. I’m old enough to remember when women were not admitted to graduate school programs including law and medical schools. A married woman could not be a “stewardess.” MS magazine was created to help that process along and many jurisdictions re-wrote laws to change the pronouns he or his to “he or she” and “his or her.” It’s an on-going process, rebels always try to take over the language and its normative effects—right comrade?
Now as to your larger remarks, which is directed to the source of ethics, I will take more time before I respond.
That special human ability: fiction and invention. (Art is such a wonderful consequence of those.) As you point, intimately linked with language. Yet while some animals have some language, they lack fiction — hence our world-altering power.
I like what I've read of Searle. (His "sea of status functions" … is he the one who also talks about the importance of implicit "background knowledge" in thought and language? That sea sounds like the same thing.) Kovesi is new to me.
Your analysis seems a useful platform for evaluating the current sociopolitical climate. Being a "liar" seems to have lost some of its stigma. Perhaps similar to "adulterer". These, as you say, are objective, intentional acts but with moral weight based on cultural norms. What's disturbing to me is the apparent drift from long-established norms — typically in reducing that moral weight. Weirdly, in both ways. We devalue the negative weight of lying or cheating and the positive weight of good acts (in disdaining those who do them as "suckers"). We've also devalued shame (which seems a shame). There's a strong ethic now of "don't judge me!"
When contrasted with the norms expressed in the consensus of human history — back at least to the Code of Hammurabi — the current sociopolitical climate seems especially transgressive. Modern times got some 'splaining to do to history.
I agree with your notion of public philosophy. To have value, philosophy (or religion) has to be fully accessible to ordinary people.
Wyrd, your comment about “implicit background knowledge” intrigued me. In my post I recommended Searle’s book “Making The Social World.” And that term seemed quite like something Searle might say. I think this work in social ontology is extremely important, especially for someone like me who focuses mostly on ethics and political theory. In this work Searle discusses “background power” which may be what you were thinking. I did a quick search for anything else your comment might refer to and, so far, came up with nothing. Background power, in general, is how society exercises power over individuals. Searle calls this “deontic power.” My post simplified Searle’s work in this area. But, anyway, deontic power is not legal power and it’s not always openly expressed and may at times be unconscious. In brief terms it refers to ways or norms that we are expected to exhibit in society. Deontic structures, according the Searle, are the source of desire-independent reasons for acting. I shall spend a little extra time on this as Searle’s work in social ontology is of great interest to me and your comment got my mental wheels spinning.
I got lucky. A couple of Searle's books I read were library books, but I happen to have bought his "Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World" (1998), and that's the book where he talks about the "Background". In an early chapter ("The Default Positions"), he lists a number of "default positions on some major questions" — that there is a real world, that we have perceptual access to it, that words typically have clear meanings and references, that statements are typically true or false, and that causation is real. He then writes:
"In our ordinary everyday lives, these views are so much taken for granted that I think it is misleading to describe them as 'views' — or hypotheses or opinions — at all. I do not, for example, hold the /opinion/ that the real world exists in the way I hold the opinion that Shakespeare was a great playwright. These taken-for-granted presuppositions are part of what I call the Background of our thought and language. I capitalize the word make it clear that I am using it as a quasi-technical term, and I will explain its meaning in more detail later.
"Much of the history of philosophy consists of attacks on default positions. The great philosophers are often famous for rejecting what everybody else takes for granted. The characteristic attack begins by pointing out the puzzles and paradoxes of the default position. We apparently can't hold the default position and also believe a whole lot of other things we would like to believe. So the default position must be given up and some revolutionary new view substituted for it. Famous examples are David Hume's refutation of the idea that causation is a real relation between events in the world, Bishop George Berkeley's refutation of the view that a material world exists independently of our perceptions of it, and the rejection by Descartes, as well as many other philosophers, of the view that we can have direct perceptual knowledge of the world. ..."
His assertion of causality as real (contra Hume) and matter as real (contra Berkeley) endeared me to him. (That anyone takes those views seriously surprises me and seems to say something about "philosophers".) As I recall, I read this as a library book and liked it so much that I bought it. Several interesting, and to me appealing, bits are highlighted.
From what you describe, his notion of deontic power sounds similar but at a social rather than metaphysical level. More than mere Background given it compels those desire-independent acts.
Wyrd, Thanks for reading my long post—very long if one considers the previous posts leading up to this one. So thanks! I’m not sure Searle mentions implicit background knowledge. If I find out I’ll get back. Yes, Kovesi is not well known. “Moral Notions” is his only book. Interesting that he wrote it soon after leaving Oxford at about the same time Searle wrote an article entitled “How To Derive Ought from Is.” I’m guessing that Hume’s “is-ought” thesis was hotly discussed among those Oxford fellows. BTW, I completely agree that “devaluing” has, in my terms, corrupted our language.
Alright Matti, you’ve convinced me. The moral “oughts” that we feel are based upon “is”. Apparently Searle was right that our language naturally sets up our notions of oughts from is, and Kovesi too. I should have known this all along given my observation that “is is all there is”. Thus if there are any oughts (and we clearly do feel them), then they can only come from is. I was imagining that my own heuristic was going further than Hume’s, though it was actually refuting his!
One related question is, what would happen if Hume’s heuristic were generally dismissed in academia? Would or should ethics begin to be explored empirically? I have radical thoughts on this but should ask what you think?
Eric, Thanks for reading this long post. Your second question is complex, yes? As I tried to say—more than once—these posts on Hume have nothing to do with the source of ethics. BTW, that was Kovesi’s position about the argument in his book as well. I will need to work on that and have no simple response. On the main point it seems the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy was very helpful in dealing with what I have been calling Hume’s muddle. And that muddle, in my opinion, starts with Hume’s misunderstanding of facts.
Yes I do realize that your posts don’t get into the origins or potential future of ethics. But I can’t help wondering what would or should happen if academia were to support the position that you’ve laid out. I doubt you’d like some of these implications, though I would.
If oughts exist by means of is, then this suggests that psychologists should ultimately become the most appropriate people to determine that which constitutes our feelings of right versus wrong behavior. I suspect that this is virtually inconceivable to most today, though that’s how I think things should eventually go. And I certainly don’t mean in a “Sam Harris” way! Here’s the path that I currently consider most hopeful:
First it should become empirically determined that consciousness (and thus value itself), exists by means of a neurally produced electromagnetic field. Thus it should be realized that the value of existing for anything is defined by quantifiable causal stuff, or “is”. Then from this premise psychologists should have enough political cover (against the deontic or background power that you mentioned with Wyrd) to develop effective hedonistic models of our nature and so succeed no less than economists already do by means of this premise. With effective psychological models from which to work these professionals should then observe that our various moral notions reduce back to a sensitivity that we feel for others (or care), as well as the theory of mind sensations that we feel, like guilt and pride. Though this should take a sizable bite out of traditional philosophy, philosophical exploration of ethics could still go on in the traditional way for some. Indeed, I suspect there will be both “meta scientists” who provide science with professionally accepted principles of metaphysics, epistemology, and axiology, and standard philosophy which remains more of an art to potentially appreciate for those who are so inclined.
Eric, I cannot get past your first sentence. You say: “If oughts exist by means of is, then this suggests that psychologists should ultimately become the most appropriate people to determine that which constitutes our feelings of right versus wrong behavior.”
1.) First, as I said, oughts do not simply exist by means of is. That’s an oversimplification. I already tried to clarify the more nuanced refutation of Hume in the original post. There’s no more I can say.
2.) Next, the rebuttal of Hume’s thesis in no way “suggests that psychologists become the most appropriate people” to further explore ethics. That, at best, is speculation and, at worst, a non sequitur.
3.) Finally, the rest of your theory apparently assumes that progress in understanding the source of ethics will be based on psychological studies of, as you suggest, the hedonistic side of our human nature. I think I understand your theory. All I can say is, I’ll wait to see the proof.
I suspect some day there actually will be proof that I’m right about these sorts of things Matti. And if history tells us anything, it’s that people only ever grasp the past though perpetually seem fooled about the future. Who knows what might start a great avalanche to bring the change that I consider both needed and inevitable? Perhaps empirical proof of EMF consciousness would unleash all that snow? In that case ethics would ultimately reduce back to such physics. Hopefully reason would then begin to prevail regarding value and so remake our sorry mental and behavioral sciences in general. It might still be weeks until I’m sufficiently satisfied with that essay, though I hope you’ll appreciate the enormous implications that such an empirical discovery would have.
Eric, I submit that to only say, as you did, that “…oughts exist by means of is…” is not I think what Searle and Kovesi fully meant. I’m not sure you mean it in such a straightforward way yourself. Certain factual descriptions, some of which have normative implications, are created in the language through a publicly conducted discussion and debate process which Kovesi describes in detail very well. And certain factual descriptions in our language then function to evaluate and/or give us (using Searle’s vocabulary) desire independent reasons for acting—that is oughts. Searle in one of his lectures a few years ago talked about how major changes in a society or revolutions involve major changes in language. Think about how the language shifted dramatically (I’m thinking of English) as the feminist movement began to persuade us that women had unrecognized rights. I’m old enough to remember when women were not admitted to graduate school programs including law and medical schools. A married woman could not be a “stewardess.” MS magazine was created to help that process along and many jurisdictions re-wrote laws to change the pronouns he or his to “he or she” and “his or her.” It’s an on-going process, rebels always try to take over the language and its normative effects—right comrade?
Now as to your larger remarks, which is directed to the source of ethics, I will take more time before I respond.
That special human ability: fiction and invention. (Art is such a wonderful consequence of those.) As you point, intimately linked with language. Yet while some animals have some language, they lack fiction — hence our world-altering power.
I like what I've read of Searle. (His "sea of status functions" … is he the one who also talks about the importance of implicit "background knowledge" in thought and language? That sea sounds like the same thing.) Kovesi is new to me.
Your analysis seems a useful platform for evaluating the current sociopolitical climate. Being a "liar" seems to have lost some of its stigma. Perhaps similar to "adulterer". These, as you say, are objective, intentional acts but with moral weight based on cultural norms. What's disturbing to me is the apparent drift from long-established norms — typically in reducing that moral weight. Weirdly, in both ways. We devalue the negative weight of lying or cheating and the positive weight of good acts (in disdaining those who do them as "suckers"). We've also devalued shame (which seems a shame). There's a strong ethic now of "don't judge me!"
When contrasted with the norms expressed in the consensus of human history — back at least to the Code of Hammurabi — the current sociopolitical climate seems especially transgressive. Modern times got some 'splaining to do to history.
I agree with your notion of public philosophy. To have value, philosophy (or religion) has to be fully accessible to ordinary people.
I have that book in my library—just haven’t reviewed it in a long time. Mystery solved. Thanks!
Wyrd, your comment about “implicit background knowledge” intrigued me. In my post I recommended Searle’s book “Making The Social World.” And that term seemed quite like something Searle might say. I think this work in social ontology is extremely important, especially for someone like me who focuses mostly on ethics and political theory. In this work Searle discusses “background power” which may be what you were thinking. I did a quick search for anything else your comment might refer to and, so far, came up with nothing. Background power, in general, is how society exercises power over individuals. Searle calls this “deontic power.” My post simplified Searle’s work in this area. But, anyway, deontic power is not legal power and it’s not always openly expressed and may at times be unconscious. In brief terms it refers to ways or norms that we are expected to exhibit in society. Deontic structures, according the Searle, are the source of desire-independent reasons for acting. I shall spend a little extra time on this as Searle’s work in social ontology is of great interest to me and your comment got my mental wheels spinning.
I got lucky. A couple of Searle's books I read were library books, but I happen to have bought his "Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World" (1998), and that's the book where he talks about the "Background". In an early chapter ("The Default Positions"), he lists a number of "default positions on some major questions" — that there is a real world, that we have perceptual access to it, that words typically have clear meanings and references, that statements are typically true or false, and that causation is real. He then writes:
"In our ordinary everyday lives, these views are so much taken for granted that I think it is misleading to describe them as 'views' — or hypotheses or opinions — at all. I do not, for example, hold the /opinion/ that the real world exists in the way I hold the opinion that Shakespeare was a great playwright. These taken-for-granted presuppositions are part of what I call the Background of our thought and language. I capitalize the word make it clear that I am using it as a quasi-technical term, and I will explain its meaning in more detail later.
"Much of the history of philosophy consists of attacks on default positions. The great philosophers are often famous for rejecting what everybody else takes for granted. The characteristic attack begins by pointing out the puzzles and paradoxes of the default position. We apparently can't hold the default position and also believe a whole lot of other things we would like to believe. So the default position must be given up and some revolutionary new view substituted for it. Famous examples are David Hume's refutation of the idea that causation is a real relation between events in the world, Bishop George Berkeley's refutation of the view that a material world exists independently of our perceptions of it, and the rejection by Descartes, as well as many other philosophers, of the view that we can have direct perceptual knowledge of the world. ..."
His assertion of causality as real (contra Hume) and matter as real (contra Berkeley) endeared me to him. (That anyone takes those views seriously surprises me and seems to say something about "philosophers".) As I recall, I read this as a library book and liked it so much that I bought it. Several interesting, and to me appealing, bits are highlighted.
From what you describe, his notion of deontic power sounds similar but at a social rather than metaphysical level. More than mere Background given it compels those desire-independent acts.
Wyrd, Thanks for reading my long post—very long if one considers the previous posts leading up to this one. So thanks! I’m not sure Searle mentions implicit background knowledge. If I find out I’ll get back. Yes, Kovesi is not well known. “Moral Notions” is his only book. Interesting that he wrote it soon after leaving Oxford at about the same time Searle wrote an article entitled “How To Derive Ought from Is.” I’m guessing that Hume’s “is-ought” thesis was hotly discussed among those Oxford fellows. BTW, I completely agree that “devaluing” has, in my terms, corrupted our language.